To what extent would a shift from the policies outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the policies outlined by the Global Zero Alternative Nuclear Posture Review significantly reduce both the threat of nuclear use and the financial cost of nuclear upkeep?
Authors Note:
This is the Senior Seminar paper that I completed for my Politics and Government degree while at Ripon College in 2019.
Abstract:
The development of nuclear weapons and their subsequent destructive power has changed the way that strategic military doctrines have been formed over the last 70 years. The threat of nuclear use has defined diplomatic and military action for decades and as a result, the nuclear policy of the United States is an essential part of national security and foreign policy doctrine. In 2010 the Department of Defense issued a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)that emphasized disarmament and mutual cooperation to lower the total number of nuclear weapons in the world. In 2018 the Department of Defense issued a new Nuclear Posture Review that recommended severe changes to United States nuclear policy. The 2018 NPR recommends a drastic increase in nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as a modernization of nuclear command, communication, and control structures. As a response to the 2018 NPR’s recommendations to increase nuclear arms the disarmament organization Global Zero offered an Alternative Nuclear Posture Review (ANPR) that recommends a drastic reduction of nuclear arms and the establishment of a minimal nuclear deterrent. As a result of their recent publication scholars have only examined the reports separately despite their interconnected nature. I compare the 2018 NPRs and the ANPR’s policies to determine if the ANPR’s claim that it would maintain the same level of deterrence without trillions of dollars of expense over the next 30 years is legitimate. The reasoning behind the two different strategies as well as their economic and strategic costs are examined to come to a conclusion about which plan can ultimately make America safer.
Introduction:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has attempted to create a comprehensive nuclear strategy that is relevant in the modern era. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction in its nuclear arsenal, the United States has worked to create a modern nuclear policy. The acting president has the authority to request a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) from the Department of Defense that defines the modern nuclear risk and outlines the changes that the presidential administration wants to make to nuclear strategy during their term in office. President Bush had an NPR released in 2002, President Obama released one in 2010 and President Trump released his own NPR in February of 2018. The NPR released by President Trump details an increasing need to upgrade and grow our nuclear arsenal. The NPR operated from the belief that “nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, they also help them avoid the need to develop their nuclear arsenals. This, in turn, furthers global security.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018, III; hereafter U.S. DoD) The report argues that to increase international security, peace, and stability the United States must not only maintain but grow its nuclear arsenal.
The report was met with a large amount of backlash from the policymakers and organizations that have spent the last several decades working to decrease rather than grow the nuclear arsenal. Global Zero is an organization composed of 300 policymakers and experts on
nuclear policy globally that is dedicated to the reduction of nuclear weapons. Global Zero is one of the organizations that has led the academic charge against the 2018 NPR’s. In September of 2018, Global Zero released an Alternative Nuclear Posture Review (ANPR) which attempts to demonstrate how the 2018 NPR’s emphasis on deterrence-plus-warfighting strategies emphasis on nuclear weapon growth and development not only endangers international security but also costs significantly more than their proposed deterrence only posture. The claims of the Global Zero movement to have a strategy that maintains international peace and stability while saving trillions of dollars are worth examining in more depth. This paper asks to what extent would a shift from the policies outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the policies outlined by Global Zero Alternative Nuclear Posture Review significantly reduce both the threat of nuclear use and the financial cost of nuclear upkeep.
While there has been a significant body of research that has been published on nuclear theory and United States nuclear policy there has been no comprehensive comparison of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the Global Zero 2018 Alternative Nuclear Posture Review. In the last fifty years, a large body of work has developed looking at various aspects of nuclear strategy in addition to different nuclear theories ranging from the various forms of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), different varieties of Nuclear Utilization and Target Systems (NUTS) theories and various components of the disarmament movement. This comprehensive body of work provides much of the framework that both of the reports exist within. The 2018 NPR operates from a modern deterrence-plus-warfighting strategy that exists within both the MAD and NUTS frameworks. The Global Zero ANPR operates from a pragmatic perspective within the disarmament movement’s goals and motivations. Due to the recency of the publications of both of the nuclear plans, there is very little literature that has been published about the plans themselves, but using the historical body of research can provide the needed context for both reports.
This research fills a gap in the current body of research on the topic because it addresses two modern reports that have not been compared yet. While some academic study has been done on the 2018 NPR because it was released in February of 2018 and because it is a major governmental document, the Global Zero response is neither old enough nor coming from a large enough organization to have gained a body of literature yet. This paper will serve to analyze both papers together to ascertain the truth of the Global Zero report’s claim that it can “provide greater stability and security at lower cost.” (Blair 2018, 8) Because the Global Zero report is in direct response to the 2018 NPR it features comprehensive counterarguments and counter proposals that are worth examining. After a full examination of the plans in both reports, this paper will ultimately agree with the Global Zero report. In this paper, I will argue that the policies within the Alternative Nuclear Posture Review proposed by Global Zero would drastically reduce the threat of global nuclear conflict while simultaneously saving the United States trillions of dollars in military development because the strategy would maintain an effective nuclear deterrent while dramatically reducing the United States nuclear arsenal.
This paper will start with an examination of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that was released by the Department of Defense. It will look at the overall framework that the NPR operates within as well as its overall strategic objectives and goals. To understand the cost of the plan this report will look at the congressional estimates of cost in addition to the information offered within the report itself. This paper will then examine the Global Zero Alternative Nuclear Posture Review. This section of the paper will start with an examination of the overall goals of the Global Zero movement as well as the report itself. After an examination of the goals of the report, this section will outline the specific parts of the NPR that are considered problematic and the alternative solutions that are offered instead. Finally, this paper will examine the potential impacts to both cost and risk that the two review plan proposes.
Modern Nuclear Policy:
President Trump ordered that the Department of Defense conduct a Nuclear Posture Review in 2017 to reassess the United States’ nuclear policy. His order to the Department of Defense states that “the Secretary shall initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review to ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies.” (U.S. DoD 2018, 1) The statement emphasizes that the nuclear arsenal of the United States should be improved to handle modern problems. The Secretaries Preface in the Nuclear Posture Review argues that this report “This review comes at a critical moment in our nation’s history, for America confronts an international security situation that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War.” (U.S. DoD 2018, I) For the first time since the Cold War, the global community seems to be moving to increase their nuclear power rather than shrink it. Threats from growing Russian and Chinese arsenals led the Secretary to the conclusion that the United States must adapt and change its nuclear arsenal to the modern threats rather than continue with the nuclear reduction that was prominent under President Obama. (U.S. DoD 2018, II) As a result, the report emphasizes a deterrence-plus-warfighting strategy in which the United States should maintain a nuclear arsenal that can be used either to deter enemy attack or to engage in tactical or larger nuclear war in times of national need. This deterrence-plus posture calls for the modernization, growth, and development of United States nuclear assets.
The 2018 NPR main goal may be to identify areas that can be upgraded in our nuclear arsenal, but its larger impact has been in terms of its ideological shift in the role of the United States nuclear arsenal. The policy recommendations that are offered in the 2018 NPR reflect a departure from the nuclear policies of President Obama and even President Bush before him. Where the last several administrations have emphasized the need to stop nuclear proliferation and to reduce the United States arsenal to encourage global arms reductions, the 2018 NPR signals a return to a strategy of nuclear growth to project strength. In 2010 the NPR stated that it “places the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the U. S. policy agenda, and describes how the United States will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons.” (U.S. DoD 2010, i) The 2018 NPR places the majority of its emphasis on the potential of conflict with the other nuclear powers and describes how the United States will increase the role and number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal.
The 2018 NPR directly explains the difference between its policy goals and those of its 2010 counterpart. It states “The last NPR was based on several key findings and expectations regarding the nature of the security environment that have not since been realized,… [that] the prospects for military confrontation with Russia, or among Great Powers, had declined and…that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other nuclear-armed states would follow.” (U.S. DoD 2018, 6) The United States has shifted its nuclear emphasis from lowering the global stockpile of nuclear weapons to maintaining the superiority of the United States arsenal. As a direct result of the growing concern about great power conflict, the United States has entered into a nuclear arms contest with Russia and China. The 2018 NPR emphasizes the importance of a large nuclear arsenal in US relations with other great powers in peace and in war which is a clear departure from previous United States policies that emphasized disarmament.
The recommended defense policy is part of an older nuclear tradition. During the Cold War, the United States developed a policy of deterrence that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD operated on the basic premise that if the nuclear powers were both able to destroy each other in the course of any nuclear strike then no nuclear attack would occur at all. (Cooper 1978) This policy implied that the foundation of peace in the Cold War became the nuclear arms race. As long as neither nation could destroy the enemy’s nuclear arsenal in a single first strike then the fear of retaliation would stop the strike from occurring at all. (Gaddis 2007) The policy of Mutually Assured Destruction is based on the interaction of large nuclear powers that require a massive deterrent to prevent conflict. The years after the collapse of the Soviet Union featured a reduction in arms because there wasn’t a need to maintain the massive threat of destruction that characterized the Cold War. The 2018 NPR is the first indication that the United States might return to a policy based on the ideas of MAD. The report itself states that “our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons.” (U.S. DoD 2018, II) This sentiment is a direct return to the policies of the Cold War and the ideas of Mutually Assured Destruction.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review’s emphasis on increasing the United States nuclear arsenal requires specific policy changes to be accomplished. The review’s main recommendations for creating a nuclear arsenal that has the strength to deter enemy threats emphasize the need to modernize the nuclear triad in addition to the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communication (NC3) structures. The Nuclear Triad is the combination of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICMB’s), nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s), and the bomber fleet carrying nuclear payloads. (Cimbala 2018, 4) The 2018 NPR intends to modernize all three of these components of the US nuclear arsenal. It also advocates for the modernization of the NC3 structures that ensure that the nuclear triad is effective in the event of a nuclear attack.
The report advocates for several clear changes to the nuclear triad. The first of these changes involves a modernization of the nuclear submarines. Currently, the United States has 14 OHIO class SSBNs that are operational and the review advocates for the creation of a fleet of COLUMBIA class SSBNs to replace the aging OHIO fleet. The report specifically requests a minimum of 12 COLUMBIA SSBNs to be created before the retirement of the OHIO fleet. The COLUMBIA class SSBNs are undetectable which makes them almost invulnerable to enemy targeting in the case of war. (Cimbala 2018) Nuclear SSBNs are perhaps the most important aspect of the nuclear triad because they are by far the hardest to destroy in the event of a nuclear strike. (Cimbala 2018) The stealth technology of the United States SSBNs is the best in the world and this part of the triad is the best deterrent that the United States has to an enemy first strike. (Cimbala 2018)
The report also advocates for the modernization of the ICBM bunkers and missiles. The modern ICBM force consists of 400 single-warhead Minuteman III missiles located in ground silos and bunkers. (U.S. DoD 2018, 16) The review encourages the development of new missiles to replace the Minuteman III in 2029 in addition to infrastructure improvements in 450 ICBM launch facilities. The ICBMs serve as the most powerful aspect of the nuclear triad in terms of their impact on enemy targets. (Cimbala 2018) The main strength of the ICBMs comes from their offensive ability to destroy rather than as an effective deterrent to enemy nuclear strikes. The destructive power of ICBMs allows them to be the main target in the event of an enemy’s first strike. The ICBMs serve as an easy target for enemy attacks in the event of a first strike, however, the more defensive bombers and SSBNs serve to dissuade that attack in the first place.
Finally, the air-based leg of the triad is identified as needing modernization in both the bombers and the bombs themselves. (U.S. DoD 2018, 16) The nuclear bomber fleet consists of 46 nuclear-capable B-52H and 20 nuclear-capable B-2A “stealth” strategic bombers. (U.S. DoD 2018, 16) The United States has begun development of the B-21 Raider and the review advocates for its integration into the bombing fleet. In addition, the review advocates for a replacement of the current B83-1 and B61-11 nuclear gravity bombs after the B61-12 bomb is done with development. (U.S. DoD 2018, 16) The review also advocates for a continuation of the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile replacement program to move away from the out-of-date Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). (U.S. DoD 2018, 17) The bombers serve to complement aggressive or deterrence based nuclear strategies. The reviews advocated upgrades to all three legs of the nuclear triad are designed to bring United States nuclear technology into the modern age.
The review also recommends the modernization of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communication structures. The NC3 structures are a combination of land, sea, and space infrastructure that is designed to maintain military contact between the civilian and military leadership and the nuclear forces in a time of crisis. (Caston et al. 2014) The 2018 NPR identifies the role of the NC3 system within the military as “performing five crucial functions: detection, warning, and attack characterization; nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces.” (U.S. DoD 2018, 56) All of these functions ensure that the United States can not only be protected from a conventional or nuclear strike but that it can also effectively operate after one has occurred. Yet, some of the NC3 infrastructure is still built around Cold War-era infrastructure and in some instances Cold War technologies and protocols. (Cimbala 2018) As a direct result of the outdated infrastructure, there is some question as to whether the United States NC3 infrastructure would be successful in maintaining contact between the President and the appropriate military assets during a time of crisis. (U.S. DoD 2018, 7) The NC3 structures are vital to the success of the United States nuclear capabilities and they have not been effectively maintained.
The 2018 NPR recommends that several measures be taken to upgrade the NC3 infrastructure. The first recommendation is that the United States increase the security of the NC3 networks from cyber warfare and other forms of interference that are being developed by Russia and China. (U.S. DoD 2018, 7) The United States also needs to increase the security of the NC3 infrastructure in the instance of a conventional or nuclear attack. The NC3 infrastructure is only effective if it can sustain a first strike to allow the United States command to retaliate. (U.S. DoD 2018, 43) The NC3 network can only fulfill its role if it is invulnerable from enemy strikes and as a result, the priority of the United States should be the modernization of these systems. In addition to working to protect the network from attack, the NC3 structures must have modern technology and communication systems that can respond effectively in the event of military need. A modernization of the hardware is necessary in addition to its protection.
The policy recommendations made in the report will require a shift in the defense budget over the coming decades. The 2018 NPR identifies the cost of both sustaining and modernizing the nuclear arsenal in its report. It identifies the cost to maintain the current nuclear arsenal at 2.7% of the total Department of Defense Budget which is a yearly expense of 17 billion dollars. (U.S. DoD 2018, 52) The report identifies that the proposed upgrades to the nuclear arsenal would cost an additional 3.7% of the total Department of Defense Budget. (U.S. DoD 2018, 52) Both of these numbers make the cost of the nuclear arsenal seem incredibly manageable in the context of the total United States defense budget, however, the numbers in the report do not fully explain the cost of the nuclear arsenal. The cost of many of the affiliated but not directly nuclear programs are not included in Department of Defense estimates about nuclear cost. (Alvarez 2017) The Department of Defense only marks funds as being for nuclear costs when they directly interact with nuclear warheads or delivery systems, all of the associated programs like research and development, NC3 upgrades, or environmental cleanup relating to nuclear material are not included in the total Department of Defense cost. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) releases the report that details the overall costs of nuclear modernization and improvement which includes these costs as well. The CBO identifies the cost
of modernizing and maintaining the nuclear arsenal at $1.2 Trillion in the next 30 years. (Congressional Budget Office 2017) In addition to modernizing and growing the nuclear arsenal, the associated cost of growing the arsenal in the ways outlined in the 2018 NPR is estimated to cost one trillion dollars over 30 years. (Tannenwald 2018) Overall, the attempts to understand the full cost of modernization, growth, and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal, nuclear support systems, and nuclear personnel are hard to fully estimate, however, the estimates presented in the 2018 NPR fall trillions of dollars short on the actual costs as estimated by the CBO and outside organizations. The nuclear arsenal costs taxpayers trillions of dollars over decades and before the costs are increased it must be shown that the increases in costs are necessary.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was published to radically alter the United States policy regarding nuclear weapons in the coming years. The 2018 NPR attempts to define nuclear weapons as the best way to maintain global peace and stability through the deterrence that a modern powerful arsenal can offer. It argues that for deterrence to be successful the enemies of the United States must be certain that there would be nothing to gain from an interference with United States interests and that there could potentially be everything to lose. To maintain this peace and stability the report encourages the modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad and the improvements and modernization of the nuclear Command, Control, and Communication infrastructure. All of these changes have a significant cost involved and have been challenged as unnecessary and in some cases even harmful to the security of the United States.
Global Zero Response to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review:
After the 2018 NPR was released in February by the Department of Defense many disarmament organizations globally reacted with a strong condemnation. For the disarmament movement, the departure from the 2010 NPR’s favorable stance on disarmament was a clear move backward from what they saw as decades of slow progress in the correct direction. As a direct result, organizations published critiques and alternative plans (Alvarez 2018, 1). Of these alternative plans, none are as detailed as the Alternative Nuclear Posture Review that was released by the organization Global Zero. Global Zero is a project that was established in December 2008 and it currently consists of over 300 global leaders in the area of nuclear strategy. The project seeks to ensure that the global community can minimize the risks of a spontaneous nuclear war in both global hotspots and between the major nuclear powers. The organization hosts conferences and publishes works relating to nuclear disarmament to move towards a world without any nuclear weapons. They believe that trust-building measures and a gradual reduction of arms can lead to a world where nuclear weapons can be safely removed. Unlike many disarmament movements in the past, Global Zero is defined by policymakers in nuclear nations that operate from a pragmatic perspective. The Global Zero movement utilizes a strong understanding of national security strategy to work towards a world without nuclear weapons.
In September 2018, Global Zero released their Alternative Nuclear Posture Review which is titled The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture which attempts to provide a clear framework for the United States to follow to minimize nuclear risk. The report states that “The United States should adopt a deterrence-only policy based on no first use of nuclear weapons, no counterforce against opposing nuclear forces in second use, and no hair-trigger response.” (Blair 2018, 1) The report offers clear policy recommendations that move in the opposite direction from the 2018 report released by the Department of Defense. The report offers a variety of policy changes that would decrease the United States’ nuclear arsenal while maintaining current levels of security. The two reports both attempt to create a more peaceful world, however, they fundamentally differ on the issue of whether nuclear weapons are vital to a peaceful global order.
The Alternative Nuclear Posture Review offers a clear difference in policy objectives because it operates from a different ideological perspective than the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The ANPR is designed to serve as a minimal deterrent to the nuclear arsenal of rival nations rather than the massive deterrent that is featured in the NPR. Blair proposed the idea that the United States already has an effective network of alliances, economic ties, and military assets to deter enemy attacks that are either conventional or nuclear. He states “The U.S. alliance’s collective economic, diplomatic, and military power can impose an unacceptably high cost on hostile behavior by adversaries and thus can serve to deter aggression and stabilize crises. Nuclear weapons play a diminishing role in this space compared to the Cold War.” (2018, 30) The emphasis on other means of deterrence is fundamentally different than the NPR’s emphasis solely on military and nuclear strength to deter the conflict. As a result of this difference in emphasis, the threat of rival aggression is defined as significantly higher within the report released by the Department of Defense. Global Zero’s holistic emphasis on what prevents attacks on the United States allows it to examine a much larger range of options and policies for the United States nuclear arsenal.
As a result of this difference in risk assessment Global Zero proposes a shift in the function of the nuclear arsenal. Currently, the United States arsenal is based on the stability of the triad and the diversity of available delivery methods. Global Zero proposes a shift from a triad-based nuclear system to a system that emphasizes a fleet of nuclear submarines that are complemented by a small group of stealth bombers. (Blair 2018, 12) The Global Zero proposal phases out the ICBM land-based missiles entirely. (Blair 2018, 12) The removal of ICBM forces would serve two main purposes. The first is that the ICBMs are by far the most vulnerable in the instance of an enemy strike. The missile silos are easily identifiable for enemy intelligence and their lack of mobility makes them a necessary set of targets in the case of a nuclear conflict. (Lowther 2009, 17) In the case of a nuclear conflict, the ICBMs would need to be launched in the initial response period for them to avoid being destroyed. (Lowther 2009, 17) Because ICBMs serve a far more offensive role in the nuclear triad they are hard to defend and are established as the best way for the United States to engage in a nuclear attack rather than retaliate to a strike that has already occurred. The offensive nature of the weapons makes both their intention and indefensibility problematic for the ANPR.
The ANPR also examines the offensive nature of ICBMs and the associated problems with their defensive use in their report. The second reason to remove the ICBM arsenal is to remove the associated hair-trigger response that is required due to its offensive nature. The nature of the missiles means that in a crisis it is necessary to launch the ICBMs before knowing the full details of an attack or even if it is a false alarm. (Gavin, 8) This immediate launch of nuclear weapons can lead to a massive escalation with another nuclear power that could have been avoided. Where submarines and bombers can survive a first strike and so they allow for more time to analyze the situation, ICBMs require quick and emotional responses. The Alternative Nuclear Posture Review argues against maintaining the force of ICBM missiles because they are the most vulnerable to enemy attack and as a result, they require an immediate emotional response to their use in a time of crisis.
The ANPR advocates for an emphasis on nuclear submarines and bombers to supplement the removal of the United States land-based leg of the nuclear triad. The ANPR advocates for the development of a fleet of five COLUMBIA class SSBNs to replace the aging OHIO class fleet. (Blair 2018, 7) of the five COLUMBIA SSBNs the report advocates for three of them to be on patrol at all times to ensure the survival of an SSBN in the case of a nuclear attack on the United States. (Blair 2018,7) This is a direct reduction from the 2018 NPR’s recommendation that the United States initially develop seven COLUMBIA class SSBNs and maintain five on patrol in addition to growing the fleet to twelve SSBNs in total in the future. (Blair 2018, 7) Each SSBN maintains over 100 active nuclear warheads that could be used in a time of crisis and the stealth capability of the submarines ensures that the weapons will survive a first strike. The ANPR also advocates for an upgrade to the strategic bombing force coupled with a decrease in total active nuclear bombers. (Blair 2018, 7) The modernization of the bombers is to ensure that their stealth technology remains capable of avoiding enemy detection rather than developing any of the new nuclear delivery systems that are advocated for in the 2018 NPR. A fleet of 40 bombers would be enough to stay active in times of crisis without wasting tax dollars on the unnecessary maintenance of far more bombers than would be necessary in a time of crisis. (Blair 2018, 8) The policy recommendations from the ANPR are designed to allow for the minimal amount of nuclear force necessary to deter outside aggression rather than a massive deterrence that costs significantly more and that can encourage a hair-trigger nuclear response.
The other main shift in the Global Zero policy is the creation of a second-strike-only nuclear policy. Currently, the United States maintains its ability to engage in nuclear first use in instances where vital United States interests are threatened. The 2018 NPR maintains that in a conventional war, the United States could engage in the use of tactical nuclear weapons to win the war. The 2018 NPR emphasizes the need to develop a variety of levels of nuclear yield to allow for the weapons to be able to be used in a variety of situations. (DoD 2018, 43) The emphasis on the development of low-yield nuclear weapons is designed to allow and even encourage the United States’ first use of nuclear weapons in a time of crisis. Blair takes a strong stance against this first-use capability in the ANPR. Blair argues that “First use would only invite nuclear retaliation and carry a risk of spiraling into a vast conflagration. Furthermore, the United States would have other tools at its disposal. Ample conventional means would be available to deter and respond to non-nuclear aggression.” (2018, 24-25) The ANPR argues that maintaining a first-use strategy only contributes to international uncertainty about nuclear use and that any first use of nuclear weapons is likely to escalate to a full-blown nuclear conflict in a way that the United States is unwilling to engage in. A strong second-use policy is key to the Global Zero strategy.
The ANPR drains significantly less resources from the United States over the next 30 years. Where the plan outlined by the Department of Defense is estimated to cost at least $1.25 trillion over the next 30 years, the Global Zero plan is significantly less expensive. The largest expenses in the 2018 NPR recommendations are in the modernization and maintenance of the ICBM infrastructure as well as the creation of 12 COLUMBIA class submarines. The complete removal of the ICBM modernization and maintenance featured in the Global Zero plan in addition to the creation of 5 COLUMBIA class submarines serves to significantly cut the overall costs. (Blair 2018,70) In addition, the Global Zero plan outlines the removal of associated nuclear munitions and warheads from military service and as a result avoids both the short-term costs of modernization and the long-term costs of maintenance. The Global Zero plan cuts the overall cost of nuclear maintenance but an estimated ⅔ over the next 30 years. (Blair 2018, 87) The Global Zero plan saves a significant portion of the total costs associated with the 2018 NPR plan.
The Global Zero plan features an ideological and policy shift from the report that the Trump administration released in February of 2018. The Global Zero Alternative Nuclear Posture Review is defined by its emphasis on deterrence being successful due to the economic and diplomatic ties of the United States rather than its military might. As a result of its view on the risk of nuclear conflict, it advocates for a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons specifically in the land-based ICBM silos. The removal of ICBMs and the emphasis on stealth submarines and stealth bombers creates a nuclear arsenal that is designed to survive a first strike without a hair-trigger response. As a direct result, the Global Zero plan is emphasized as being key to international stability in a time of nuclear crisis and as being significantly cheaper than its alternative for no tangible loss in the United States nuclear deterrent. The Global Zero plan takes a more holistic approach to the strengths and vulnerabilities of the United States arsenal than the 2018 NPR.
Comparison of the Different Nuclear Plans:
| 2010 NPR | 2018 NPR | Global Zero Plan | |
| Objective | Maintain a reasonable level of deterrence while gradually disarming the United States and its rival nuclear nations. | Match the growth of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals in order to have a nuclear parity. | Maintain a minimal level of deterrence while removing all unnecessary nuclear arms. |
| ICBM’s | Gradual reduction of missiles as a result of agreements with Russia. | Increase the number of effective ICBM’s and modernize the current arsenal. | Remove ICBM’s entirely from the United States arsenal. |
| Strategic Bombers | Maintain a fleet of 46 nuclear-capable B-52H and 20 nuclear-capable B-2A “stealth” strategic bombers | Increase the number of nuclear-capable bombers and stealth strategic bombers. | Maintain a fleet of 40 stealth strategic bombers. |
| Nuclear Submarines | Maintain 14 OHIO class SSBNs | Replacement of the OHIO class SSBN’s with a minimum of 12 COLUMBIA class SSBNs. | Replacement of the OHIO class SSBN’s with 5 COLUMBIA class SSBNs. |
Despite the fundamentally different perspectives on what role nuclear weapons should play in the United States military, the two plans do agree on several points. The Alternative Nuclear Posture Review agrees with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review on the issue of command, control, and communication structure modernization. Both of the reports examine the state of the aging United States command, control, and communication structures and define the NC3 infrastructure as unnecessarily old and unable to cope with the threat of an enemy first strike. Regardless of whether the United States arsenal has increased or decreased in size, the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis scenario relies on the NC3 infrastructure. The Global Zero report identifies the same flaws and agrees on all fronts with the Department of Defense on the danger that is posed by the status quo of our infrastructure. The NC3 structures need to be updated and if both reports agree it serves as an indication of updates that are necessary regardless of ideological stance on nuclear weapons.
The reports also both identify the shift in recent nuclear policy by both Russia and China but they differ on the reasons for and the impact of those policy shifts. The Russian and Chinese militaries have spent the last decade modernizing their nuclear arsenals and those modernizations have catalyzed the 2018 NPR and the subsequent Global Zero response. Similarly to the United States NC3 structures, the NC3 structures and arsenal for Russia and China are in drastic need of updating and repair and the nations have worked to change that over the last 10 years. (Blair 2019, 70) When examining the nuclear modernization of Russia and China the 2018 NPR identifies the modernization programs as how Russia and China intend to challenge the United States’ nuclear dominance. The 2018 NPR operates from the premise that Russian modernization programs are a rising threat to the United States and that they must be matched if the United States is going to maintain its security. From this perspective, the modernization programs of Russia and China are a direct challenge to United States authority and they must be met with a similar nuclear modernization at home. This conception of rival nuclear modernization is the foundation for the 2018 NPR policies of increased nuclear force.
The Global Zero report understands rival nuclear modernization as the direct result of outdated nuclear weapons rather than the start of a challenge to the United States arsenal. It identifies that both the Russian and Chinese arsenals are outdated and that if those nations want to keep a nuclear arsenal at all they need to perform these upgrades. Bruce Blair asserts “In the case of Russia, the mundane reality is that replacing its decrepit forces was long overdue when it began more than a decade ago. Its nuclear and conventional forces had all but collapsed during the 1990s along with the Russian economy, which relied heavily on income from exports of oil and gas.” (2018, 70) Furthermore, the ANPR analyzes the timeline of the three modernizations to show that none of the modernization programs are attempting to start a nuclear arms race. The report states “The timelines for all three modernizations extend over multiple decades, hardly a rush by any of the three countries to gain exploitable strategic advantage over one another.” (Blair 2018) The difference in perspectives about the modernization programs of Russia and China define the two nuclear policies.
The largest difference in the two plans comes from their respective recommendations on whether the United States arsenal should increase. The 2018 NPR advocates for a complete overhaul of the modern United States arsenal over 30 years to fully upgrade all three aspects of the nuclear triad. The ANPR takes a fundamentally different stance and advocates for the removal of the ICBM fleet and the reduction of the number of bombers and SSBNs that are fieldable at any given moment. The 2018 NPR would cost significantly more over 30 years as the arsenal is not only modernized but also grown in size. Yet, the cost is justified if you accept the report’s main premise that without these expenses global security is at risk. All of these policies ultimately boil down to the question of what role nuclear weapons play in the modern world. The 2018 NPR asserts that for global peace and prosperity, the United States nuclear arsenal must be robust and capable of engaging in either offensive or defensive attacks. The ANPR report advocates for global peace based on mutual trust and a minimal nuclear deterrent. The emphasis for both reports is on global peace but they arrive at that goal in very different ways.
The Alternative Nuclear Posture Review published by Global Zero provides a set of policies that are better designed to the threats of the modern world than the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. John Lewis Gaddis, a well-renowned Cold War historian, describes why nuclear weapons are unlike other weapons in his book The Cold War: A New History. Gaddis describes how nuclear weapons change the political calculation that leaders undergo when considering war in a way that other methods of waging warfare simply do not. Gaddis states that the purpose of any war is to accomplish political or military objectives that leave your nation or national interest in a position that is better than it was before the war. (2007, 52) A nuclear war of any kind is destined to result in the mass destruction of not only a nation’s military might but also of its civilian population for decades to come. The threat of such destruction makes it so that the benefits of potentially going to war are never going to outweigh the threat of destruction. (Gaddis 2007, 58) In the modern era, the same analysis can be applied to the threat from Russia and China.
To understand the threat of a global nuclear war the factors relevant to deterrence must be examined. The question must be asked, is there any situation in which a nuclear conflict with the United States would result in a better political, economic, or military situation for the nation that is considering aggressive action? The United States is the center of the global economic system and any destruction of the United States economy would result in the collapse of the international economy as well. David Vine notes in an analysis of the modern system of alliances that “U.S. alliances provide a degree of collective security that their rivals (great-power competitors) can only envy. Seventy-six countries host U.S. military bases for reasons of mutual security.” (2017) The Department of Defense states that “one hundred seventy countries host U.S. military forces on their territory, and dozens of those states host a sizable U.S. military presence.” (DoD Manpower Data Center 2017) The United States system of alliances and military bases makes it the undisputed greatest military force on the planet. For either Russia or China to risk a nuclear conflict they would need to be certain that their civilization could survive the collective response of US allies and the economic blow that would be dealt to their civilian population after the collapse of the international economy. The force of both of these factors serves as an incredibly powerful deterrent to attacks against the United States. As Bruce Blair notes in his report “The U.S. alliance’s collective economic, diplomatic, and military power can impose an unacceptably high cost on hostile behavior by adversaries and thus can serve to deter aggression and stabilize crises. Nuclear weapons play a diminishing role in this space compared to the Cold War.” (2018, 30) The United States deterrent is far more complex than the 2018 NPR makes it out to be.
Conclusion:
When analyzing the two different nuclear plans it is essential to analyze the complex nature of the United States alliance system and the need for a powerful nuclear deterrent. The United States’ influence is large enough for a massive nuclear deterrent to be unnecessary. If the political and economic might of the United States is enough to deter a potential nuclear attack from Russia or China any increase in the nuclear arsenal above a minimal deterrent is unnecessary. The Global Zero report operates from this premise and it effectively makes the argument that any increase to our nuclear arsenal would not only waste tax dollars, but it would encourage Russia and China to continue their modernization programs. The 2018 NPR’s extreme deterrence only serves to create an arms race that costs the US taxpayer money that could have been used on programs at home.
Global Zero claims that their Alternative Nuclear Posture Review can achieve the same level of security as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review released by the Department of Defense. Blair directly states that “this study concludes a deterrence-only approach would provide greater stability and security at a lower cost.” (2018, 7) In measuring this claim it is clear that the Global Zero plan would come at a significantly lower cost. And when examining the impact of the plan on security and stability it is important to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the United States deterrence. The threat of the United States military alliances and an international economic collapse allows for fewer nuclear weapons to be necessary for the United States to deter international conflict. The Global Zero plan utilizes this reality to create a policy that is based on the ability of the United States nuclear arsenal to survive a first strike rather than for the nuclear arsenal to serve as a method of warfighting. The claims by Blair in the report are legitimate when you leave the narrow lens used by the Department of Defense.
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